From ICA Bangladesh
By M. Azizur Rahman

Introduction

Research and advocacy is one of three key areas of ICA Bangladesh’s human development work. Since 2004, some important issues like HIV/AIDS, deforestation, and crime and policing were focused in its research and advocacy programs. Religious militancy and terrorism, one of the socio-political concerns of Bangladesh today, are the most under-researched topics here. This article is about a study project recently conducted on the topic by ICA Bangladesh with a research grant of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC), Planning Ministry of the Government.

Project Description

The main purpose of the study entitled “Understanding religious militancy and terrorism in Bangladesh” is to document and highlight the problem in Bangladesh. It examined the extent and nature of various Islamist militant groups and their terrorist activities here. It also looked at the underlying factors of militancy, the funding sources, and the strategies and techniques used by terrorist groups. Recommendations were made on how best to address the menace of militancy and terrorism.

The study mainly used content analysis of secondary sources (media reports, books, magazines, research reports and internet publications) and expert interviews. We looked at two widely circulated newspapers – the Ittefaq and the Daily Star – issued between 2001 and 2010. Two others - the Daily Prothom Alo and the New Age along with other other sources such as South Asia Terrorism Portal were used to supplement the data. Eight experts representing law enforcement practioners, security research organizations, human rights organizations, academics and civil society members were interviewed on terrorism in Bangladesh. Based on secondary analysis, case studies on five convicted militants were done to explore their level of involvement, leadership, justice response and media coverage.

While Bangladesh has been facing leftwing extremist and ethnic militancy since its independance, religious militancy has posed serious threats to national security, public safety and economic development. Immediately after the 9/11 US attack, Bangladesh was presented by the international media as a new hub of terrorism after Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The study found Islamist extremism and militant activities rose dramatically from 1999 to 2005, but the presence of Islamist terrorist outfits and groups can be traced back to the 1990s. Islamist militancy has become a serious law and order issue after the nationwide serial bomb blasts in August 2005. Bangladesh has not seeen any major terror attacks since 2006. The study also found it has not been rated as a terror-risk country in recent years. However, the government is very serious about addressing the problem of militancy and terrorism.

The study could not find the exact number of militant groups or outfits. From media reports alone, it identified 68 outfits, both homegrown and international. Many of these outfits change names or reorganize in different names. The study revealed that JMB (Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh), JMJB (Jagrata Muslima Janata Bangladesh), HUJI-B (Harkatul Jiahad al Islami Bangladesh) AHAB (hle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh), (HuT), Hizbut Tahrir (HuT) and HT (Hizb-ut Towhid) are the major terrorist groups with thousands of militant members. JMB has almost one million members (full-time and part-time), HUJI has more than 25,000 activists and JMJB over 30,000 militants.

The study showed that during the period 1999-2010, Islamist militants carried over 203 attacks, killing 164 innocent people and injuring more than 2658 people. From 2005 to 2010, 25 terrorists were killed. The content analysis of media reports showed that most of these attacks targetted the

rallies of political parties (Awami League, Communist Party of Bangladesh, cultural groups (Udichi, Shatadal), cultural celebrations and fairs (new year, fair, jatra, circus, international trade fair), urs (death anniversaries of saints), Ahmadia mosques, churches, intellectuals, diplomats, movie theatres and NGO offices. JMB alone reportedly carried out over 100 operations. Most of these attacks involved bomb explosions and grenade.

The study revealed that homegrown militant outfits have links with regional and international militant networks. Some of these militant outfits and their leaders were linked with three major political parties – Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), Jamat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JIB) and Islami Oikyo Jote (IOJ). During the BNP-led alliance government, political patronization was reportedly blamed for the rise of militancy, extremism and radicalization.

These militant outfits and their leaders were linked to financiers from several countries including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan to which they travelled in different times. Bangladeshi militants received funds from individuals and charity organizations based in the Gulf countries, USA, UK and EU. Madrassa students were also engaged in collecting tolls and among other sources – zakat, sadka and money raised for Islamic waz mahfil (speech or gathering). Hundi (informal money transfer) was used by militants. Even through formal banks, terrorist financing continued but remained undetected.

Some foreign nationals linked with Pakistan based Lasker-e-Taeba (LeT) and India based Hizbul Mujahedee (HM) had links with Bangladeshi militant outfits. Some were sheltered by Bangladeshi militants and some were even employed in madrassa (Islamic seminary institutions) across the country. Many of these outfits have overlaps in

terms of training, operations, leadership, resource mobilization and agenda. HUJI is found to be used as a training unit while JMJB is an operational unit of JMB. But they also have links with non-religious insurgent groups within and outside the country such Rohinga Solidarity Organization (Myanmar), Maoist extremists of Nepal and Indian insurgent groups (ULFA). RSO is found to be arms supplier of JMB and HUJI. Intelligence and media reports indicate that RSO and Rohinga refugees in Cox’s Bazar, and the Indian North East ethnic insurgent groups including ULFA are involved in arms smuggling.

The study revealed that 1,033 militants were arrested during the period 2003-2010 and majority were from JMB (542) followed by HuT (208), HT (87) and Allahr Dal (68). During 2006-2010, 171 militants were sentenced for cases including August 17, 2005 nationwide bomb blasts, killing of judges, attack on cultural activists and possessing explosives and arms. Out of 171, 19 militants were sentenced to death, 77 militants were sentenced to life imprisonment, 38 militants were awarded imprisionment for longer duration (between 20 years and 48 years), 26 were awarded between 10 and 19 years, and 11, between 5 and 8 years of imprisonment. Only 29 of them were fined as well; the amount ranged from Taka 5,000 to Taka 20,000.

While there are various anti-terrorism laws enacted, most of these cases were executed under Explosives and Substances Act, Arms Act and Speedy Tribunal. Only one case was executed in 2010 under the anti-terrorism act. There is no case under the anti -money laundering law. Anti-terrorism act and anti-money laundering act appeared in 2008. Before these, another anti-terrorism was passed in 1992. But the definition of terrorist acts was broader and included many offences in the

criminal code. Besides, previously enacted and politically motivated laws such as Special Powers Act, Public Safety Speedy Tribunal and anti-terrorism act of 1992 were used against oppostion political party members and activists.

The study found the government is using mostly a law-enforcement centric counter-terrorism approach such as banning militant outfits, arresting militants and sealing bank accounts. The government is eager to identify militant networks, financiers and arms suppliers, and to hold awareness raising campaigns through schools, mosques and community to root out militancy. But awareness raising at schools, madrassas, communities and rural areas are still in infancy stage. Law-enforcement measures alone cannot prevent militancy and terrorism, a comprehensive stretegy balancing enforcement, intervention and prevention is needed to address the menace of militancy and terrorism. Anti-organized crime measures against arms and drug smuggling, money laundering including hundi, surveillance of foreign-funded Islamic NGOs and border security must be ensured. Police and intelligence agencies must have logistics, equipment and training in dealing with militancy and terrorism cases, conducting investigations, and assessing data regarding militancy and terrorism. Independent NGO Affairs Bureau, anti-corruption agency and Bangladesh Bank must be in place.

While it is found that various socio-economic issues are associated with the menace of religious extremism, radicalization and militancy, poverty-driven areas (southern and northern districts) and population groups (unemployed youths among refugee camps, madrassa students and poor people) must be considered as a priority for development. The curriculum of madrassas, where millions of students are educated, must be reformed. School syllabus need to include issues of militancy and terrorism. Community-level anti-militancy campaign can be implemented through religios leaders (imams at mosques), Ansar (security forces at local level and VDP (village defence party) members, teachers, community leaders and politicians, and local administration.

Concluding Remarks

ICA Bangladesh is planning to disseminate the study findings through media publications and public forums. ICA methods and approaches in future research and advocacy projects can include diverse perspectives and generate stantial outcomes. It is expected that the SSRC will undertake the institutional measures to disseminate the results for policy implications

M. Azizur Rahman is a PhD Student at the Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa.