-zakat, sadka and money raised for Islamic waz mahfil (speech or gathering). Hundi (informal money transfer) was used by militants. Even through formal banks, terrorist financing continued but remained undetected.

Some foreign nationals linked with Pakistan based Lasker-e-Taeba (LeT) and India based Hizbul Mujahedee (HM) had links with Bangladeshi militant outfits. Some were sheltered by Bangladeshi militants and some were even employed in madrassa (Islamic seminary institutions) across the country Many of these outfits have overlaps in terms of training, operations, leadership, resource mobilization and agenda. HUJI is found to be used as a training unit while JMJB is an operational unit of JMB. But they also have links with non-religious insurgent groups within and outside the country such Rohinga Solidarity Organization (Myanmar), Maoist extremists of Nepal and Indian insurgent groups (ULFA). RSO is found to be arms supplier of JMB and HUJI. Intelligence and media reports indicate that RSO and Rohinga refugees in Cox’s Bazar, and the Indian North East ethnic insurgent groups including ULFA are involved in arms smuggling.

The study revealed that 1,033 militants were arrested during the period 2003-2010 and majority were from JMB (542) followed by HuT (208), HT (87) and Allahr Dal (68). During 2006-2010, 171 militants were sentenced for cases including August 17, 2005 nationwide bomb blasts, killing of judges, attack on cultural activists and possessing explosives and arms. Out of 171, 19 militants were sentenced to death, 77 militants were sentenced to life imprisonment, 38 militants were awarded imprisionment for longer duration (between 20 years and 48 years), 26 were awarded between 10 and 19 years, and 11, between 5 and 8 years of imprisonment. Only 29 of them were fined as well; the amount ranged from Taka 5,000 to Taka 20,000.

While there are various anti-terrorism laws enacted, most of these cases were executed under Explosives and Substances Act, Arms Act and Speedy Tribunal. Only one case was executed in 2010 under the anti-terrorism act. There is no case under the anti -money laundering law. Anti-terrorism act and anti-money laundering act appeared in 2008. Before these, another anti-terrorism was passed in 1992. But the definition of terrorist acts was broader and included many offences in the criminal code. Besides, previously enacted and politically motivated laws such as Special Powers Act, Public Safety Speedy Tribunal and anti-terrorism act of 1992 were used against oppostion political party members and activists

M. Azizur Rahman is a PhD Student at the Department of Criminology, University of Ottawa

The study found the government is using mostly a law-enforcement centric counter-terrorism approach such as banning militant outfits, arresting militants and sealing bank accounts. The government is eager to identify militant networks, financiers and arms suppliers, and to hold awareness raising campaigns through schools, mosques and community to root out militancy. But awareness raising at schools, madrassas, communities and rural areas are still in infancy stage. Law-enforcement measures alone cannot prevent militancy and terrorism, a comprehensive stretegy balancing enforcement, intervention and prevention is needed to address the menace of militancy and terrorism. Anti-organized crime measures against arms and drug smuggling, money laundering including hundi, surveillance of foreign-funded Islamic NGOs and border security must be ensured. Police and intelligence agencies must have logistics, equipment and training in dealing with militancy and terrorism cases, conducting investigations, and assessing data regarding militancy and terrorism. Independent NGO Affairs Bureau, anti-corruption agency and Bangladesh Bank must be in place.

While it is found that various socio-economic issues are associated with the menace of religious extremism, radicalization and militancy, poverty-driven areas (southern and northern districts) and population groups (unemployed youths among refugee camps, madrassa students and poor people) must be considered as a priority for development. The curriculum of madrassas, where millions of students are educated, must be reformed. School syllabus need to include issues of militancy and terrorism. Community-level anti-militancy campaign can be implemented through religios leaders (imams at mosques), Ansar (security forces at local level and VDP (village defence party) members, teachers, community leaders and politicians, and local administration.

Concluding Remarks

ICA Bangladesh is planning to disseminate the study findings through media publications and public forums. ICA methods and approaches in future research and advocacy projects can include diverse perspectives and generate stantial outcomes. It is expected that the SSRC will undertake the institutional measures to disseminate the results for policy implications.